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 In July 2013, WikiLeaks supporters took out a full-page advertisement in The New York Times 
with the banner headline “We Are Bradley Manning.” The goal of all the signatories to the ad included in 
the “we” was to stand up for what they considered to be the important acts of citizenship in which they 
believed Manning to have engaged when he passed along diplomatic cables and other sensitive or 
classified material to the autonomous network. 
 
 The headline was more empirically accurate than signatories might have supposed. A profound 
challenge to the very concept of the nature of the legal subject is among the ways in which the suite of 
investigations and legal challenges of the WikiLeaks complex affect information policy and, in turn, law-
state-society relations. U.S. government arguments used during Manning’s seminal trial introduced a 
number of innovations in this area that could play critical roles going forward. Where these arguments are 
accepted, all those who signed the advertisement—indeed, all those who just followed news about 
WikiLeaks—might be considered liable. 
 
 Some of the information policy questions raised by the investigations and cases of the WikiLeaks 
complex are receiving a lot of attention, with online privacy and access to information about government 
activities notable among them. Others are less apparent, but it is not the extent of public awareness of an 
issue, the amount of media coverage devoted to it, or the amount of evidence available on one side or 
another that determines the relative importance of a given policy problem. Just as those involved in 
patent wars fight to own patents as early as possible in particular production processes as a means of 
controlling those processes in their entirety, so policy decisions, diversions, innovations, and reversals 
have their greatest impact when they challenge not only existing laws but policy-making processes 
themselves. Issues at stake in the WikiLeaks complex are of this kind. 
 
 By “information policy” we mean all laws, regulations, doctrinal principles, and practices affecting 
any kind of information creation, processing, flows, access, use, and destruction. More colloquially, 
information policy is an umbrella phrase referring to laws and regulations for information, communication, 
and culture. Information policy is particularly important among what political scientists call “issue areas,” 
because it provides the context—the affordances and constraints—for all other decision making. 
Information policy is also the most reflexive aspect of a government, modulating the information flows 
within government and between a government and the rest of the world (Braman, 2007). 
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 This essay begins by thinking through just what we mean by the legal subject as an individual 
and collective identity. It goes on to look at the possible identities—and, therefore, legal subjects—
intertwined in WikiLeaks as an exemplar of contemporary autonomous networks of political and legal 
importance. Where they are critical to the determination of a lawsuit, evidence of identities must be 
offered in court; the essay introduces some of the evidentiary questions upon which cases involving 
autonomous networks such as WikiLeaks will turn as introduced by the U.S. government during the 
Bradley Manning trial. 
 
 The information releases from cables and about the Iraq War were not the first, nor was 
information about governments the only type of information released. Matters involving national security, 
however, are unique among policy issue areas in their capacity to affect even the most fundamental 
doctrinal positions, matters at the constitutional level. With the cases arising out of Cablegate, there is 
also the first-mover advantage; the outcome of the Bradley Manning trial will in turn provide precedent 
(and evidence) that can then be used in other cases. Thus, it is upon the releases of cables and 
information about the Iraq War that this essay focuses. 
 
 Many governments are investigating matters raised by WikiLeaks and the many additional leaks 
from various sources that have taken place since Cablegate. References to U.S. law dominate here 
because of its relative importance in legal globalization processes, because it was the release of U.S. 
diplomatic cables that finally spurred governments around the world to engage with WikiLeaks, because 
the first trial of a person associated with WikiLeaks is taking place in the United States, and because of 
space and time limits. It would be valuable to learn how the same issues are working themselves out in 
the legal systems of other countries. 
 
The Legal Subject 
 
 In the face of the law, the question of personhood arises distinctly at at least three different 
levels: whether one is identifiable as a legal subject; whether one is subject to a specific legal jurisdiction 
(not the same thing as being a citizen); and whether one has standing, the right to be involved with a 
specific legal matter.1 Here the focus is on the first of these. 
 
 Issues of personhood underlie many of today’s most intense legal and political struggles. 
Participants in the Occupy, Indignado, and related social movements oppose corporate personhood 
altogether (apparently not realizing that if it were abolished, corporations could not be subjected to the 
law at all and the conditions about which those movements are concerned would only worsen). There are 
those for whom concern about “preborn children” justifies opposition to abortion (apparently not realizing 
that if the rights of generations to come must be taken into account legally, they become critical to 
environmental policy). Every possible variation on the theme has shown up in discussions about 
migration. The rights of the “nonhuman” have been receiving serious legal attention at least since the 
                                                 
1 Standing relative to any given law or regulation begins with the requirement that the entity involved is 
subject to the legal system within which that law or regulation is embedded, but often goes beyond that to 
other characteristics or circumstances that are statute- or regulation-specific. 
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manuscript of Stone’s (1975) memorable book, Should Trees Have Standing? was first sent to Supreme 
Court Justice William O. Douglas while the Court was considering a key environmental case. The extent 
and nature of legal rights, if any, of robots and intelligent software agents are being explored and  are 
becoming increasingly salient. Governments are treated as legal individuals when they sue and are sued. 
 
 The right to recognition, or the right to legal personality, developed in the 17th century under the 
influence of the ideas of Hugo Grotius and Thomas Hobbes. Its initial uses were to create a means of 
conceptualizing various types of organizations as persons in order to subject them to the law. The 
Westphalian system of international relations, with its rules for diplomacy and war, worked because states 
were legal persons under international law. During the 19th century, corporations became full legal 
persons within national legal systems and during the 20th century, nongovernmental organizations did so 
as well. It was during the formation of the League of Nations in the early 20th century that the concept of 
the legal person began to be used in reference to individuals, considered the necessary first step for the 
protection of civil rights; the concern was to ensure that those groups often historically denied legal 
personhood—slaves, women, those who are stateless, children, and other marginalized groups—had rights 
as legal subjects. In a development pertinent to the struggles over issues raised by the WikiLeaks 
complex, President George W. Bush took the position that terrorist suspects were not legal persons under 
existing international law (Galchinsky, 2013). 
 
 WikiLeaks, as an autonomous network, takes us into this world because it is a type of collectivity 
that does not yet have formal status under the law. Figuring out just how to categorize various types of 
networks for legal purposes has become necessary given the growing influence of this mode of organizing. 
Legal systems classify social forms in order to implement—in social science terms, “operationalize”—the 
rules set down in laws and regulations that establish different rights and responsibilities for diverse 
entities. What we expect and require from a corporation is not the same as what we expect and require 
from a public interest advocacy group or a city government. Since categorizations affect how members of 
a group are perceived, there can be consequences for determinations of guilt and sentencing as well. In 
lawsuits involving WikiLeaks and other leaks of government information, the difference for a defendant 
between being perceived as a citizen whistleblower driven by a sense of political responsibility and being 
perceived as a terrorist treasonously attempting to destroy the country will be key. 
 
  With the WikiLeaks complex, there are not only many legal subjects but several concentric layers 
in an onion of ever-widening definitions of the subject. If the first type of legal subject involved in the 
complex of legal issues raised by WikiLeaks is the biological individual —Julian Assange, Bradley Manning, 
and others—the second is the WikiLeaks network. Just as characteristics of individuals affect how they are 
treated as legal subjects (Assange is an Australian citizen, Manning was in the U.S. military at the time of 
the alleged actions for which he has been charged), so characteristics of networks affect how they are 
treated by the law. A third type of legal subject is involved in the WikiLeaks complex as well, including the 
associational network of networks; for example, the intertwining of WikiLeaks and other autonomous 
networks such as Anonymous and Lulz could be used to justify treating the entirety as a single legal 
subject. And a fourth: If the legal subject of concern includes everyone who made use of the information 
from diplomatic cables released in Cablegate, it then includes, among many others, The New York Times, 
The Washington Post, and officials in the U.S. government. And a fifth: If the legal subject includes 
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everyone who read about WikiLeaks, the people involved, or the information released, the circle gets 
vastly larger. “We are,” as the advertisement in The New York Times said, “Bradley Manning.” 
 
 Thus, it becomes essentially impossible to imagine the individual who could not, according to 
some decision rule or another, be considered a legal subject with liability for WikiLeaks information 
releases. This is particularly the case where “lone wolf” rules apply (as in the United States), making 
loners who are not a part of social and communicative networks suspect for that reason alone. The 
WikiLeaks complex thus provides circumstances in which innovations conceptualizing the legal subject are 
being explored and the limits of the legal subject are being revisited. 
 
Who Is WikiLeaks? 
 
 Often we can, must, or will find it useful to distinguish WikiLeaks from Julian Assange. But there 
are times when the two are essentially equivalent, for Assange continues to drive the organization and 
serves as its public face. In a 2006 essay, “Conspiracy as Governance,” Assange theorized about 
manipulating networks to undermine centers of power. Notably, he highlighted the strategic value of weak 
links, the marginal or relatively low-status individual; a defense in the Manning trial is that he would not 
(or should not) have had access to the information leaked at his low military rank. Assange concluded the 
essay by promising a next step, and shortly afterward launched WikiLeaks.  
 
 At the time of writing, Assange as an Australian citizen is under investigation for espionage by 
the U.S. government,2 continues to fight extradition from house arrest in the United Kingdom to Sweden 
to respond to sexual charges, is or was the subject of a European campaign led by an Australian legislator 
to encourage the Swedish not to turn Assange over to the United States should he ultimately have to 
return to Sweden, and has taken on life as a media celebrity. Assange has launched an Australian political 
party that received under 1% of the votes in a recent election, the WikiLeaks organization became 
involved in the effort to protect subsequent leaker Edward Snowden (now living in Russia), and the 
Manning trial has concluded with a verdict of guilty on many charges but not of aiding and abetting the 
enemy, the treasonous charge that, upon conviction, can carry a death sentence. Still, there are others 
involved in WikiLeaks, there are individuals outside of WikiLeaks whose stories are essential to the 
shaping of legal responses to such information releases, and Assange as a person has a life that preceded 
and may succeed WikiLeaks. 
 
 The question of just how the legal subject is to be defined is not a matter only of concern to 
those who are themselves at the margins. Expanding the legal subject—from an individual, to a network, 
to a network of networks, to anyone using information, to anyone accessing information—is of profound 
importance. The advantages and disadvantages of such flexibility in definition of the legal subject have 
                                                 
2 In the United States, the charge under consideration at the time of writing would be espionage. 
Evidence brought to light in, and the ultimate determination of, the Bradley Manning trial will bear 
significantly on the extent to which the U.S. government believes it could have a case against Assange on 
this charge. 
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been demonstrated recently in uses of a concept of a particular type of legal subject—the terrorist—by 
governments around the world (Braman, 2011). 
 
Networks as Legal Subjects 
 
 It is easier to theorize, conceptualize, refer to, and even visualize networks than it is to 
understand them well enough for legal purposes. The counterterrorism effort, however, greatly stimulated 
interest in applying network theory when thinking about the legal subject (Borgen, 2008). It is not simply 
a matter of applying supposedly or allegedly neutral analytical techniques. Because models of networks 
effectively construct reality, “the integration of networks into legal descriptive contexts must be conducted 
very carefully. The unreflected adoption of their implied presumptions will inevitably clash with normative 
legal requirements” (Boysen et al., 2007, p. 1080). Where software agents trigger legal actions, problems 
raised by “posthuman law,” in which machinic decision making replaces, supplants, or supersedes that of 
humans (Braman, 2002) pertain. 
 
 It was in the worlds of economics, technology, and the law that the practicalities of the transition 
to a network society first became sites of political struggles, conceptual innovation, legal creativity, 
programming expertise, and corporate experimentation. For economists, the network joins the market and 
the “hierarchy,” or firm, as a third means of organizing economic transactions. The “network firm” is a 
corporation so entwined with others that the long-term project, rather than the firm or the industry, is the 
most valid unit of analysis; organizational boundaries are permeable and shifting; and cooperation and 
coordination are as important as competition for long-term economic success (Antonelli, 1992). Such 
economic networks leave traces in legal documentation such as contracts, agreements, financial reports, 
and filings; records of transactions, memberships, and client relationships; and other information, 
including e-mail and any documents circulated via e-mail that may become subject to legal scrutiny via 
the discovery processes that can precede trials. It is precisely the point that such traces are not available 
for autonomous networks that pride themselves on the anonymity and independent actions of their 
members and, in many cases, their rejection of the legitimacy of legal systems themselves. 
 
 This lack of formal legal traces can work both for and against a legal subject. It can provide 
protection, making it more difficult—though not impossible—for a government or Interpol to establish who 
members of groups such as WikiLeaks or Anonymous are. It can also, though, undermine or make 
impossible protections that might otherwise be available. The WikiLeaks failure to complete the website 
registration required to trigger coverage under the Swedish constitutional provision specifically protecting 
confidential sources of information (Jakobsson, 2011) means that the purported reason for locating 
WikiLeaks servers in that country would be irrelevant in a courtroom because the protections will not 
apply.3 
 
                                                 
3 Even where the same kinds of legal protections may exist in diverse legal cultures around the world, 
they may have very different origins. In the United States, there are protections for confidential sources of 
journalists, but these are based on interpretations of much more abstract constitutional language as 
developed across the guiding court decisions. 
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 To technologists, a network is autonomous when it is decentralized, with content held on servers 
of member users rather than those of profit-oriented corporations. Xerox PARC will “soon” release 
technologies to support the formation of multiple privately controlled autonomous social networks for 
everyday use. The “unlike.us” electronic mailing list is one example of a group of individuals—in this case, 
those who work at the nexus of technology, art, and politics, who are trying to develop their own 
decentralized social networks. Legal anthropologists note that the growth of semiautonomous social fields 
interacts with the emergence of similarly semiautonomous legal systems (e.g., Shariff, 2008), the latter 
often described as “quasi-legal.” 
 
 Autonomous networks such as WikiLeaks raise several problems for legal proceedings that 
include assigning accountability, determining who is within the network, and challenges to the nature of 
the legal processes themselves. Clarifying both concepts and practice vis-à-vis such networks is the 
current challenge. 
 
Individuals as Legal Subjects  
   
 Three ways in which the law interacts with individual identity are pertinent to the problem of 
anonymous networks as legal subjects: anonymity, professional identity, and citizenship. Online 
anonymity was under attack prior to Cablegate, but the effort to make it impossible has intensified. 
Professional identities provide filters on legal arguments. Citizenship involves not only jurisdictional and 
fealty issues but also positive obligations.4 
 
Anonymity 
 
 The importance of anonymous speech as a protection for those critical of government or of their 
employers has been legally recognized. Anonymity is often essential for whistleblowing (reporting on 
corporate or governmental misconduct that can harm individuals, groups, or society at large). In the 
commercial world, anonymity encourages some individuals to engage more freely in electronic commerce. 
Sociologically, anonymity makes it possible to experiment with personal identity online while participating 
in social media. 
 
 Anonymity can be chosen by oneself, accomplished statistically, or provided by another who 
protects the confidentiality of one’s identity. The last of these in particular may bear on WikiLeaks cases. 
Courts acknowledge that legitimate reasons for protecting the confidentiality of a news source are myriad, 
reasonable, and strong. Individuals may be concerned about their safety and that of their families should 
it become known that they had spoken with journalists. Ongoing relationships with sources require mutual 
trust that could not be built without reliable promises of confidentiality. And there are certain subjects 
about which it is unlikely a journalist could ever acquire much information without having, in turn, assured 
                                                 
4 For further discussion of the information policy implications of individual and collective identity—and 
relationships between the two—see the chapter, "Information Policy and Identity" and the accompanying 
bibliographic essay in Braman (2007). 
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the source of confidentiality. Protections of confidential news sources are legal acknowledgement of the 
importance of the news function to society. 
 
 In some familiar flavors, and some new, several factors place pressure on anonymity in the 
Internet environment. Arguments against permitting anonymity online include the needs to determine the 
legal jurisdiction under which an individual’s activities fall, to surveil, and to implement mandated 
restrictions (such as age restrictions for pornography). The technological ability to track and retain 
detailed information about what individuals do online presents its own temptations. Protections have their 
limits in the competitive game of mathematics and computational capacity. Because that game can go 
through essentially infinite iterations, it should not be surprising that there are now full-blown commercial 
industries in both anonymizing technologies and the technologies used to break encryption and other 
anonymizing techniques. 
 
 The anonymizing setup of WikiLeaks was designed by Julian Assange, and owes a great deal to 
his programming prowess. It works so well, he claimed, that even he has no way of knowing whether 
Bradley Manning actually was the source of the Cablegate materials. One of the interesting features of the 
design is that it combines ancient techniques (just don’t connect, here operationalized by creating an “air 
gap” between two computers with no links between them) with the very newest. Another is its inherent 
irony—Assange created a secrecy barrier around those who divulge the secrets of others.  
 
Professional Identities 
 
 Professionalism was an early-20th-century development that was part of the crystallization of 
distinctions among categories of knowledge and the bureaucratization of ever-more areas of life. 
Professionalism includes specialized training in accredited programs, licensing, continuing education, and a 
commitment to a profession-specific code of ethics. Medicine and the law are classical examples of 
professions in this sense. Used more loosely, the notion can be extended to any type of labor-based 
identity that filters relationships with particular laws and regulations, norms and expectations. 
 
 In information industries such as journalism and librarianship, professionalism has been sought 
and claimed. In many countries, though, professionalism has served more effectively as an ideal and a 
training tool rather than as a matter of formal bureaucratic recognition and practice. In the United States, 
for example, it is deemed unconstitutional to license journalists because of the opportunities licensing 
offers for control via regulation or threat of withdrawal of the license. Shy of formal professionalization, 
there are other jobs for which there are legal expectations regarding what can and cannot be said. Under 
securities regulation, for example, specific rules govern what information can be shared and under what 
conditions for those in diverse roles that range from financial advisor through those who provide tips. 
Labor law, too, has been an important source of job-related protections for and constraints upon speech of 
certain types. In the United States, it looks as if it will be labor law, for example, that provides the 
opening wedges for resistance to employer use of social network postings to terminate or otherwise 
punish employees. 
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 Professional identities are important from a free speech perspective when protections for certain 
types of information exchanges are available only to those in particular professions. Relational privacy 
zones, for example, commonly protect most communications between individuals and doctors, lawyers, 
and religious confessors. The press has no special status under constitutional protections for free speech 
in the First Amendment in the United States, but a test has been developed that courts must meet to 
legitimately compel journalists to divulge their confidential sources of information or go to jail. About two-
thirds of the states provide additional protection for the confidentiality of journalists’ sources under 
“shield” laws. 
 
 The question of to whom this protection should apply has become problematic now that blogs, 
YouTube, Twitter, and other online media are being used for critically important journalistic purposes. 
Whether Assange should be considered a journalist is unclear. The extent to which WikiLeaks identified 
itself as a journalistic organization changed over time, moving toward a closer identification with the 
profession (Savage, 2010). During Cablegate, Assange crowed about having moved on to another level in 
the news organization hierarchy by serving as editor to the editors of news publications such as The New 
York Times, The Guardian, and Der Spiegel when they worked on details of the cable releases. That 
perception was not shared; then editor-in-chief of The New York Times Bill Keller (2011) described 
Assange’s role as that of a source. Where journalists are professionals in the bureaucratic sense, with 
training and testing requirements, registration, and actual licensing, Assange will not qualify. 
 
 Bradley Manning’s identity as a soldier who made pledges when he accepted his responsibilities 
significantly affects his case. His trial took place within the military rather than the civil justice system. 
Thus, although at the time it would have been unconstitutional to treat a U.S. citizen not in the military in 
this way, it was legal to imprison Manning indefinitely without charge. He was held under such tortuous 
conditions that it raised a public outcry and a government official resigned before Manning was moved to 
more tolerable conditions. A number of other elements of the trial procedure within the military justice 
system differ from those in the civil justice system. 
 
Citizenship 
 
 The identities of various players in the WikiLeaks complex as citizens of their respective countries 
have jurisdictional importance, filtering legal and political opportunities, contexts, and consequences. The 
number of countries that provide legal access to government information, for example, keeps growing, but 
significant differences exist across countries regarding just what that means; citizenship rights in this 
regard, then, vary by country. Differences across time periods within the same country also exist, 
including on the very interesting political and cultural question of just what it is that the good citizen 
needs to be informed about, as Schudson (1999) reminded us. 
 
 The WikiLeaks cases raise questions about who should have access to a particular government’s 
information when that government’s activities have global effect—questions already raised by those over 
the past couple of decades who have thought and acted in terms of global citizenship. A proposal for 
defining citizenship in terms of extent and relative likelihood of the effects of a given government on a 
particular individual already has been put forward (Koenig-Archibugi, 2012). Many significant WikiLeaks 
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releases have dealt with information from and about the private, not public, sector, provoking further 
social structures and processes. And there are questions about how citizens can meaningfully—not just 
noisily and with exuberance—express themselves in ways that can effectively influence political and legal 
decision making. 
 
Collective Identity 
 
 Additional identities accrue to individuals as a result of their participation in organizations, 
networks, and other collectivities—entities that are legal subjects as corporations, or nonprofit 
organizations, or neighborhood groups. Just as it is impossible to talk about the individual identity of the 
citizen without directly or indirectly, implicitly or explicitly, making assertions about the identity of the 
state (and vice versa), so it is impossible to talk about the identity of an autonomous network without 
making the same kinds of assertions about the individuals involved (and vice versa)—and about the 
nature of the associations themselves. Those who implement the law are among the many who now use 
network analysis tools and concepts. The specific features of autonomous networks, however, deserve 
specific attention as we think through the legal context for WikiLeaks. 
 
Network Analysis and the Law 
 
 The popularity of network analysis is in part a computational turn, for it was only in the 1990s 
that the software and computing capacity necessary to use such methods on large-scale networks became 
widely available. Not coincidentally, this was also when the Internet began to offer up a mass of 
networked flows of information begging for analysis using such tools. Additional growth in the use of these 
methods post-9/11 can be attributed to the combination of counterterrorism funds and political will as well 
as academic interest in theoretical and empirical developments. 
 
 Of course, there are many ways of studying networks that do not involve mathematically driven 
network quantitative analysis, any method has its weaknesses, and many important research questions 
exist for which network analysis is not helpful. Additional difficulties arise for using these methodological 
tools to study an autonomous network. When group borders are permeable, shifting, ambiguous, and 
anonymous by nature—as with WikiLeaks—which individuals should be considered members of a given 
network for legal purposes? What kinds of links among individuals are sufficiently pertinent to activities or 
intentions that they can validly be used as evidence? Are there any legal constraints on the means by 
which information to be used as evidence is collected? When there is neither a decision-making center nor 
any evident organizational hierarchy, where is legal culpability to be assigned? Who within a network 
should assume, in all senses of that word, liability? To what extent is a member of a network responsible 
for the activities of any other given individual within the same network, regardless of whether those 
activities were carried out in the network’s name or whether those activities had been approved of and/or 
were known by that individual? 
 
 The first step in analysis of any contemporary information policy issue should be to contextualize 
it historically; a qualitatively new issue rarely appears. There is legacy law regarding associations among 
individuals both biological and fictive, claims of network autonomy, and confidentiality as a dialogic 
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relationship that bridges the individual and network levels of analysis at the link level. Beyond this terrain, 
most legal systems are just beginning to adapt to networks as legal subjects, although exploratory work in 
the legal and law and society literatures has been undertaken for several decades. 
 
Legacy Law 
 
 Several areas of legacy law feed into how we think about autonomous networks as legal subjects. 
Competition (antitrust) law focuses on the question of when informational relationships among the fictive 
individuals of corporations go beyond acceptable practice into legally unacceptable collusion. Discussion of 
constitutional protections for the right of association per se typically focuses on individuals who have left 
deliberate traces, in records, physical participation in group activities, and/or other visible signs of their 
membership in the group. And there is a history of providing the special privacy protections of 
confidentiality within the context of some types of professional relationships. Of the first two of these 
pertinent areas of legacy law, the history of the right of association is fairly well documented, but 
competition law is yet to be mined for what it offers regarding subtleties of informational relationships that 
might be of use in other legal domains.  
 
 Protection of the confidentiality of communications within professional relationships with 
physicians, attorneys, and religious confessors is particularly interesting for its theoretical provocations. 
With the importance of professionalism for some legal issues involving individual identity discussed above, 
this again highlights the rarely discussed importance of labor as a determinant of speech conditions. It is 
also significant that the types of relationships awarded confidentiality protections historically were “thick” 
in the Geertzian (1973) sense, comprised of many types of ties and rich in the amount of personal 
information shared, albeit often unidirectionally (from the layperson to the professional). The types of 
relationships asserted as meaningfully associative in WikiLeaks investigations fall at the other extreme of 
the spectrum of relative richness; they are as thin as possible, so thin we describe them as links rather 
than relationships, or even as interactions or transactions. Critiques of the replacement of thick knowledge 
of humans with the much thinner traces of bureaucratic records are replete. The links now being discussed 
as of interest for the purposes of determining legally important association are one or more orders of 
magnitude farther removed from the real humans involved than are such bureaucratic categories. 
 
 Gaps between thin information and thick humans raise two issues. The first involves warranting. 
Bureaucratic records require authority and authentication for there to be trust that a given set of records 
applies to the claimed individual; with links, the warranting claims themselves require warranting. The 
second involves limits to the kinds and extent of knowledge available based on thin informational records 
only; one may arrive at a website out of confusion, by mistake, for legitimate research purposes, because 
one was unwillingly diverted, or because of a technical failure. Arrival on a Web page does not mean that 
the page is read, far less what was made of it if so. The claim that having had access to a piece of 
information is in itself evidence of a meaningful relationship with other people—and of political intention 
and will—is an assertion that will often be invalid. 
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Autonomous Networks 
 
 As a digital autonomous network, WikiLeaks has several characteristics that further confound 
efforts to clearly establish its identity as a legal subject. The group is inherently international and skews 
young. Involvement is not only anonymous but informal, voluntary, and may be ephemeral. Still, the 
network has scale, as demonstrated by the hundreds of mirror websites that appeared when Assange first 
went underground during Cablegate. Issues of network capacity, the value of weak links, and assumptions 
about indirect links by the security establishment, as briefly introduced in the next section, affect the 
nature of WikiLeaks as a legal subject.  
 
 Because many members of the network have significant programming skills, innovative digital 
tactics and strategies can be developed between and during campaigns. As is the case in any competition, 
changes in tactics and strategy make it more difficult for the opposing party to operate. Innovations can 
create phenomenological conditions different enough from those of other technologies that they require 
independent legal evaluation. In the long term, this feature of WikiLeaks and related contemporary 
practices stimulate the development of countertechnologies for use by those in the intelligence/security 
establishment. As such, they might be described as “pre-policy.” 
 
Evidence 
 
 Where any of the individual, collective, or dialogic identities is asserted in the courtroom, 
evidence must be provided. The problem of how to reliably and validly determine the causal relations, 
intentions, and effects of various kinds of claimed informational relations is at the heart of the Bradley 
Manning trial. Some of the kinds of evidence and analysis presented will be familiar. Others may be less 
so, because they are generally obscure or because they are legal innovations. The incomplete list of 
possibilities that will receive attention includes material support, determining cause by effect, 
informational association, and indirect relationships. 
 
Material Support 
 
 The question of what it means to aid and support the enemy runs throughout the WikiLeaks 
complex. The answer matters, because it involves treason, the most serious of the possible charges 
available in situations involving leaks of government information. In the United States, treason is the only 
type of speech criminalized at the constitutional level, and those convicted of it can be put to death.5 
 
 The 18th-century constitutional language involving treason talks about providing “aid and 
comfort” to enemies and those with whom the United States is at war. Over time, the concept of comfort 
came to be interpreted as “providing material support.” The 2001 USA PATRIOT Act defined material 
support to include training, expert advice or assistance, service, and personnel in provisions then applied 
to the provision of education in the peaceful use of legal means of seeking political change. Just a few 
                                                 
5 The other 20 information policy principles in the U.S. Constitution offer positive principles upon which to 
base laws and regulations that affect speech and the speech environment (Braman, 2007). 
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months before Manning’s pretrial hearing, the U.S. Supreme Court found this provision of the law 
constitutional in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (2011), a case in which the defendants were a group 
of lawyers involved in just such activities. As critics of the statute and of the decision argue, this 
expansion of the definition of treasonous speech to include training in how to peacefully and legally 
engage with political processes criminalizes peacekeeping efforts as well as those devoted to 
strengthening the rule of law. 
 
 The case involved an incident that took place before WikiLeaks was created, but the Supreme 
Court decision is important to cases involving the WikiLeaks complex. The fact that this was the one 
charge upon which Bradley Manning was ultimately not convicted sets important precedent for future 
cases that will evaluate the legitimacy of the sharing of politically important information, even though he 
was sentenced to 35 years in prison on other charges. Where the notion that material support can include 
education in the peaceful pursuit of legal means of political change, it will interact with treatment of 
indirect contacts (even where there are no intercedent links) as legally meaningful. In such a situation, 
association will be literally in the eyes of the beholder—the state. The state’s imagination is likely to be 
stimulated by an interest in perceived associations of political import. 
Determining Cause by Effect 
 
 The novel argument that evidence of intention can be supplied by presenting documentation of 
effects appeared during Bradley Manning’s pretrial hearing. The government argued that Zimbabwean 
government use of materials from the cables released by WikiLeaks is evidence that Manning intended to 
aid the enemy. This is particularly interesting, because there is also evidence that U.S. government 
officials made positive use of materials from the same cables, with some individuals making it known to 
the press that, from the government perspective, there had been positive uses of the released 
information. 
 
 Whatever picture of the overall effects of Cablegate is generated in the courtroom, to a social 
scientist, intentions and effects are two very different things. However good the evidence of one, it cannot 
tell you about the other. This is why, despite decades of effort to hold content producers liable when 
consumers of that content harm themselves or others by acting out that content in their own lives, it is 
difficult—if not impossible—to win such a case against the media. The idea of reversing the direction of the 
causality of social processes for legal purposes is not new with this evidentiary innovation, however. We 
saw it first in the USA PATRIOT Act’s criminalization of activities that had taken place up to 15 years 
earlier—activities that were legal at the time they were undertaken. 
 
Informational Association 
 
 Though not historically referred to as such, legal interest in informational association has been 
around as long as banned books and forbidden languages. As is the case in many areas of the law affected 
by innovations in digital technologies, though, Engel’s law—the rule that quantitative change can yield 
qualitative change—applies. In the online environment, the amount of information that can be accessed is 
orders of magnitude larger than would have been the case for anyone in the past, including those in 
centers of learning such as the Cambridges, English and American. That quantitative change in itself so 
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qualitatively changes the information environment that the notion of informational association not only 
deserves but requires reconsideration to develop foundational principles, legal arguments, laws and 
regulations, and implementation programs. 
  
 We also now have significantly greater capacity to analyze ever-increasing amounts of 
information in ever-more ways than was the case historically. What has been described by one scholar as 
a “mosaic” theory is being used to argue that the ability to combine, analyze, and make inferences from 
individual pieces of information can change legal access to information into illegal (Pozen, 2005). 
Recently, a version of this line of argument was used in defense of civil liberties in the U.S. Supreme Court 
decision in US v. Jones (2012), which held that it is unconstitutional for the government to use a GPS 
tracking device for extended periods without a search warrant because doing so crossed the line from the 
collection of individual pieces of information into a search. Such a theory, most likely under other rubrics, 
could appear in cases and investigations involving the WikiLeaks complex. 
 
 A genre argument is to be made as well. For its investigation of Assange, the U.S. government 
won a legal battle to gain access to information about individuals who were in communication with 
Assange and Manning via Twitter. To our knowledge from reports in the mass media, only a few key 
individuals identified as a result of this are now also subjects of investigation. However, the legal language 
in the government’s request could be used to go after anyone who was tracking Twitter feeds about 
WikiLeaks and the information it released—even if only as a means of tracking the news. 
 
 There is a long history of special, effectively punitive, legal treatment of the news by 
governments desirous of silencing critical political debate. Stamp taxes, for example, including those 
which were among the immediate triggers to the American Revolution, add to the costs of producing and 
reading the news. It was during the presidency of George W. Bush that government officials first tried to 
discover the identity of an anonymous government critic by asking newspapers for information about who 
had read certain news stories cited in critiques. The U.S. government has now been told that it is 
constitutional to identify untold numbers of individuals around the world (given variable search terms and 
hashtags) as suspect targets simply because of an informational association that could be as thin as 
merely having received information about WikiLeaks via Twitter. Questions likely to be addressed if and 
when this position is challenged again include looking at whether the exposure to the information was 
witting or unwitting (that is, whether the person exposed to the information was aware of that exposure 
and cognizant of the information), whether the exposure was intended, whether the exposure was under 
normal or traumatic conditions (the biochemistry of memory works differently under traumatic 
conditions), whether the information was ever used, and whether any meaningful effects resulted from 
either the exposure to the information or its use.  
 
 Individuals in groups charged with terrorism have explicitly rejected the idea that people who 
share news about them were political associates and should be considered legally liable for actions being 
pursued. When members of a Turkish hacker group, RedHack, that had broken into government websites 
and leaked information were indicted with the possibility of facing up to 24 years in prison for being 
members of a terrorist group, RedHack argued: “Those 10 people have no ties with us; they are only 
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innocent people who shared the news [on online platforms] about us,” a member of RedHack told a 
reporter (Güneş, 2012, para.3) in response to the indictment. 
 
Indirect Contact 
 
 Evidentiary issues discussed up to this point have included attention to genre, content, 
information uses, and network link formation via exposure to public third-party information. Some 
important conceptual developments regarding how to understand links themselves also have been made. 
The question of whether a link between Julian Assange and Bradley Manning was material enough to 
justify pursuing Assange was raised during the Manning pretrial hearing, and that type of question will 
repeatedly arise in cases involving members of autonomous networks. At some point what might 
potentially be called a link may be so attenuated, or the path so improbable, that it is not reasonable to 
treat it as a link at all. Early in 2011, the U.S. government announced that it had found no evidence of 
“direct contact” between Assange and Manning. By December, before Manning’s pretrial hearing, the focus 
of the investigation was changed to “indirect contact.” Evidence of this at a sufficient level to pursue 
Assange was presented during Manning’s trial.  
 
 An interest in the political valence of extended associations was announced not long after 9/11, 
when then–Attorney General John Ashcroft suggested that those protecting homeland security should be 
exploring associations out to six degrees of separation. After leaving government in 2004, Ashcroft 
entered the world of business and, among other activities, joined the advisory board of a firm that has 
developed what it describes as innovative approaches to network analysis that start from the assumption 
that effective networks may be comprised of individuals among whom links are weak, indirect, or 
nonexistent, and thus not ordinarily visible. The company’s software, the Lucid Threat Management 
System, identifies “previously unknown illicit networks that are hiding in plain sight” using existing 
information resources of a client to analyze network evolution and simulate and test interventions, 
manipulations, and constraints (Dulles Research, n.d., p. 1). 
 
The Question 
 
 The provocation for this essay was a 2011 invitation to think through how developments in the 
WikiLeaks complex affected the field of information policy. Important exemplars of informational issues 
affected by these developments include many that have received a significant amount of attention by 
others, such as its impact on the right to privacy and the appropriate limits of surveillance as well as free 
speech issues. Here attention has focused on challenges to the very nature of the legal subject in the 
network environment and new arguments that have been put forward by the U.S. government in the 
course of trying Bradley Manning—now Chelsea Manning—for leaking the material in what became known 
as Cablegate. Where those arguments are pushed to their limits, the network of concern for the actions 
for which he was convicted could, potentially, include any, and all, of us. And, thus, the legal insight as 
well as political rhetoric in the advertising heading, “We are Bradley Manning.”  
 
 
 
International Journal of Communication 8 (2014)  WikiLeaks and Information Policy  2617 
References 
 
Antonelli, C. (1992). The economic theory of information networks. In C. Antonelli (Ed.), The economics of 
information networks (pp. 5–27). Amsterdam, The Netherlands: North-Holland. 
 
Assange, J. (2006). Conspiracy as governance. Retrieved from me@iq.org (Julian Assange’s old website, 
now obsolete). 
 
Borgen, C. J. (2008). A tale of two networks: Terrorism, transnational law, and network theory. Oklahoma 
City University Law Review, 33, 409–433.  
 
Boysen, S., Buhring, F., Franzius, C., Herbst, T., Kotter, M., Kreutz, A., von Lewinski, K., et al. (2007). 
Networks in public law. German Law Journal, 8, 1079–1089. 
 
Braman, S. (2002).  Posthuman law:  Information policy and the machinic world, First Monday. Available 
at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_12/braman/index.html  
 
Braman, S. (2007). Change of state: Information policy and power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
 
Braman, S. (2011). Anti-terrorism laws and the harmonization of media and communication policy. In R. 
Mansell & M. Raboy (Eds.), Handbook of global media and communication policy (pp. 486–504). 
Oxford, UK: Blackwell/Wiley. 
 
Dulles Research. (n.d.)  Home page.  Retrieved from http://www.dullesresearch.com   
 
Galchinsky, M. (2013). Quaint and obsolete: The “war on terror” and the right to legal personality. 
International Studies Perspectives, 14, 255–268. 
 
Geertz, C. (1973). Thick description: Toward an interpretive theory of culture. In C. Geertz, The 
interpretation of cultures: Selected essays (pp. 3–31). New York, NY: Basic Books. 
 
Güneş, E. (2012, October 8). Hacker group faces up to 24 years in prison for “terrorist crimes.” Hürriyet 
Daily News.  Retrieved from http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/hacker-group-faces-up-to-24-
years-in-prison-for-terrorist-crimes.aspx?pageID=238&nID=31906&NewsCatID=339   
 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. ___ (2010). 
 
Jakobsson, P. (2011, July). WikiLeaks and Swedish law. Paper presented to the International Association 
of Media and Communication Research, Istanbul, Turkey. 
 
Keller, B. (2011, January 26). Dealing with Julian Assange and the secrets he spilled. The New York Times. 
Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2011/01/30/magazine/30Wikileaks-t.html 
 
2618 Sandra Braman International Journal of Communication 8 (2014) 
 
Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2012). Fuzzy citizenship in global society. Journal of Political Philosophy, 20(4), 
456–480. 
 
Pozen, D. E. (2005). The mosaic theory, national security, and the Freedom of Information Act. Yale Law 
Journal, 115, 628–679. 
 
Savage, C. (2010, December 15). U.S. tries to build case for conspiracy by WikiLeaks. The New York 
Times. Retrieved from www.nytimes.com/2010/12/16/world/16wiki.html 
 
Schudson, M. (1999). The good citizen: A history of American civic life. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
 
Shariff, F. (2008). Power relations and legal pluralism: An examination of “strategies of struggles” 
amongst the Santal Adivisi of India and Bangladesh. Journal of Legal Pluralism, 57, 1–43. 
 
Stone, C. D. (1975). Should trees have standing? Toward legal rights for natural objects. New York, NY: 
Avon Books. 
 
U.S. v. Jones, 565 US ___ (2012). 
 
 
